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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. 1
SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS.1
SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.3
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.4
ACTION.
Joinder of different Causes growing out of same Transaction.-A
cause of action for false imprisonment may be joined with a cause of
action for slander, when both arise out of the same transaction: Harris
v. Aveqy, 5 Kan.
In such a case, where the petition alleges that both causes of action
arose out of the same transaction, and when the other facts stated in the
petition are not inconsistent with such allegation, Held, that a demurrer
to the petition on the grounds "that it appears on the face of the peti-
tion that several causes of action are improperly joined," should be
overruled: Id.
ADMIRALTY.
Pilot Laws- Collision.--A state pilot law having provided for the
educating and licensing of a body of pilots, enacted that all masters of
foreign vessels bound to or from one of the state ports "shall take a
licensed pilot, or, in case o~f refusal to take such pilot, shall pay pilotage
as if one had been employed." It enacted further, that any person not
licensed as a pilot, who should attempt to pilot a vessel as aforesaid,
should be "deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, be
punished by a fine not exceeding $100, or imprisonment not exceeding
sixty days," and that all persons employing any one to act as a pilot not
holding a license, should "forfeit and pay the sum of $100." The
pilot first offering his services to a vessel inward bound had a right to
pilot her in, and when she went out the right to pilot her out. Held,
that under this statute vessels were compelled to take a pilot: The
China, 7 Wall.
But held, further (the statute containing no clause exempting the
vessel or owners from liability for the pilot's mismanagement), that the
responsibility of the vessel for torts committed by it not being derived
from the law of master and servant, or from the common law at all, but
from maritime law, which impressed a maritime lien upon the vessel in
whosesoever hands it might be for torts committed by it, the fact that the
statute thus compelled the master to take the pilot did not exonerate
the vessel from liability to respond for torts done by it, as, ex. gr., for
a collision, though the result wholly of the pilot's negligence: 1d.
Collision.-Although the rules of navigation require that a vessel
I From J. W. Wallace, Esq., Reporter, to appear in 7 Wall. Reports.
2 From Hon. C. K. Gilchrist, to appear in 5 Kansas Reports.
3 Fr6m the Judges, to appear in 48 N. H. Reports.
4 From Hon. 0. L. Barbour, Reporter; to appear in vol. 52 of his Reports.
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coming up behind another, and on the same course with her, shall keep
out of the way, yet the rule presupposes that the other vessel keeps her
course, and it is not to be applied irrespective of the circumstances
which may render a departure from it necessary to avoid immediate
danger: The Grace Girdle, 7 Wall.
Where, in case of collision with loss, there is reasonable doubt as to
which party is to blame, the loss must be sustained by.the one on which
it has fallen: Id.
This court will not readily reverse in a case of collision depending on
a mere difference of opinion as to the weight and effect of conflicting
testimony, where both the District and Circuit Courts have agreed. It
affirmed accordingly a decree in such a case: Id.
AGREEMIENT.
In Fraud of Creditors; Account of Transactions wnder.-An action
will not lie to compel the defendant to render an account of his receipts
and expenditures, and of his'transactions, and to convey to the plaintiff
real estate which he holds under a trust agreement entered into for the
benefit of the plaintiff, where it appears that the object of such agree-
ment was to prevent a creditor of the plaintiff from enforcing and col-
lecting a judgment and demands held against him, and that it was
designed to hinder and delay such creditor in the collection of judg-
ments: Sweet v. Tinslar, 52 Barb.
An agreement of that nature is fraudulent in point of fact and in
law; and as fraud vitiates all contracts, the court will not lend itself to
aid either party in its enforcement. Nor will- it assist one of them, by
directing an accounting and a conveyance of real estate by the other:
Yd.
Setting aside in Equity.-The doctrine is well settled that a court of
equity will not set aside an agreement intended to defraud third parties,
as between the parties themselves: Id.
CnucKs.
Time of Presentment.-It is well settled that presentment of a check
or draft on a bank, the day after it is drawn, is in season. Checks and
drafts are subject to the same rule in this respect: Kelty et al. v. The
Second National Bank of Erie, 52 Barb.
Where the facts are not disputed, whether due diligence has been
used is a question of law for the court: Id.
What is a Payment of-Where, on presentment of a check or draft,
the holder receives from the drawee a check for .the amount, such check
is not a payment, if not paid; and hence the draft does not cease to be
a valid obligation. The subsequent return of the check and receipt of
the draft, and protest of the latter, in due season, will preserve its
vitality, and the holder may recover the amount from the drawers: IR.
CIRCUIT COURT
Jurisdiction and Practice.-The Act of February 28th 1839, § 8, 5
Stat. at Large 322, providing for the transfer, under certain circum-
stances named in it, of a suit from one Circuit Court to the most conve-
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nient Circuit Court in the next adjacent state, is not repealed by the Act
of March 3d 1863, 12 Stat. at Large 768, providing that under certain
circumstances named in it, the circuit judge of one circuit may request
the judge of any other circuit to hold the court of the former judge
during a specified time: supervisors v. Rogers, 7 Wall.
. A court of the United States has power to adopt in a particular case a
rule of practice under a state statute; and where a Circuit Court is pos-
sessed of a case from another circuit, under the above-mentioned Act
of 1839,- it may adopt the practice of the state in which the Circuit
Court is held from which the case is transferred, as fully as could the
Circuit Court which had possession of the case originally: R5.
CORPORATION.
Dissolution.-The insolvency of a corporation, or the fact that it has
assigned all its property and effects to an assignee for the benefit of its
creditors, does not extinguish its legal existence. Neither does the
failure to elect officers or to hold meetings for many years dissolve the
corporation: Parsons v. Fureka Powder Works, 48 N. H.
DAMAGES.
WLen Exemplar..Damages may be given.-Exemplary damages are
only to be given in case of fraud, malice, gross negligence, or oppression:
Gram v. Hadley, 48 N. H.
The court erroneously instructed the jury, with the assent of counsel
for defendant, that they might give exemplary damages in the case if
they saw fit, when there was no evidence that warranted such'instruc-
tions. After verdict for -plaintiff and a motion by defendant to set the
same aside as against the law and the evidence, Held, that if it did not
appear affirmatively from the verdict or the evidence reported, whether
any exemplary damages were given, or, if any, how much, the verdict
would not, under these circumstances, be set aside: while, if defend-
aut's counsel had seasonably objected to the instructions given and
requested the proper instructions, the entire verdict, under similar cir-
cumstances, would be set aside: Id.
But when it appears affirmatively, either by the verdict or the evi-
dence reported, that exemplary damages were given, -and to what
amount, the court will, even under the circumstances of this case, cor-
rect the error in the verdict by ordering a r'emittitur for such exemplary
damages and allowing the plaintiff to -take judgment for the residue:
Id.
Where a trade was negotiated between the plaintiff and defendant by
a third person, one B., and the question is, "What was the understand-
ing of the two parties in relation to the trade?" after the terms of the
offer or proposition which the defendant made to B. are shown by coni-
petent evidence, then it may be shown, either by B. or b the plaintiff,
that the same offer or proposition was communicated by B. to the plain-
tiff and accepted by him: Rd.
DEED.
Dewnpt iou of Encumbance-A deed conveying premises "subject
to a certain mortgage executed by the parties of the first part on said
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premises, in the year 1856, of $1000," sufficiently describes the mort-
gage; as an examination of the record will disclose the name of the
mortgagee and the date of the record: Johnson v. Zink, 52 Barb.
EVIDENCE.
Lost Instrument-Time of Objection to Competencg of Evidence.-
When the only evidence of the loss or destruction of a written instru-
ment is that of one witness, who testifies as follows: "The order is now
so mislaid that I cannot find it :" Held, that all oral or other secondary
evidence of its contents is incompetent and inadmissible: Johnson &
Sweeny v. .Mathews, 5 Kan.
The proper time to object to the introduction of testimony for incom-
petency is when such testimony is offered in evidence at the trial: Id.
A party who does not object, while a deposition is being taken, to the
testimony of a witness, on the ground that it is or may be at the trial
incompetent, does not thereby waive his right to make such objection at
the trial: 11.
The plaintiffs in their petition alleged, "that the defendant contracted
to transport a brick machine for them from Kansas City to Fort Scott
without delay, which he neglected and refused to do," but they did not
allege or attempt to prove on the trial that the defendant at the time of
making the contract had any knowledge of what the plaintiffs wanted to
do with the machine, or that they intended or expected to have any hired
hands to run the machine. Held, that the court did not err in exclud-
ing all evidence tending to show that plaintiffs had a large number of
hands in their employ who were idle on account of not getting the
machine at the time it should have been delivered : 11.
EXECUTOR.
8iats against 'in .New Hamnshre.-If a suit be prematurely brought
against an executor, upon a debt due by the deceased; under see. 1, chap.
161, Rev. Stats., being within one year from the granting of adminis-
tration: the executor must plead that fact in abatement and not in bar:
Amoskeag .faanfacturing Co. v. Barnes, 48 N. H1.
But in a suit against such executor on such claim, the plaintiff must
prove affirmatively, as a part of his case, even under the general issue
pleaded, that his claim was presented to the executor within two years
from the granting of administration according to the provision of see. 2
of said chapter, and without such affirmative proof he cannot recover:
Id.
When such suit is brought against such executor on such claim more
than three years after the granting of administration, such executor
(except in certain specified cases) must plead in 'bar the limitation con-
tained in sec. 5 in said chapter: MI.
The executor is not at liberty in such case to omit to plead the limita-
tion of that statute, as he may the general Statute of Limitations, in
cases where the debt is otherwise just: Id.
Nor can the executor by any new promise or guaranty take said claim
out from the operation of this provision of the statute: hut te same will
be barred after the expiration of said three years aa agpinst the state,.
though said executor may make himself personally liable by such new
promise: 1.
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FORECLOSURE SALE.
Right of Purchaser to Rents.-A purchaser at a foreclosure sale is
not entitled to the rents of the mortgaged premises which accrue between
the sale and the delivery of the deed, where such purchaser does not
complete his purcbase at the time designated in the terms of sale:
Mitchell v. Bartlett, 52 Barb.
Thus, where the purchaser refused to complete his purchase, and the
premises were resold, and the second purchaser also refused, and the "
premises were resold a third time, and were bought by a person acting
for the original purchaser, when the sale was completed by the latter
under his first purchase: Held, that he was not entitled to the interme-
diate rents: Id.
In such a case the deed does not relate back to the day of sale, so as
to entitle the purchaser to the rents accruing between the sale and the
giving of the deed; where he has by his own act, and in violation of his
contract, delayed the completion of the purchase: Id.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Agreement not within.-Although hop-roots, when rooted in the
ground, are a part of the real estate of the proprietor of the soil, and
will pass to the purchaser by a conveyance of the land, and to the heir,
by inheritance, yet where the plaintiff agreed by parol to deliver to the
defendant a quantity of hop-roots, at a future time, at a specified price
per bushel: Held, that this was not an agreement to sell or purchase an
interest in real estate, but was an executory contract by the plaintiffs to
purchase for, or to sell and deliver to, the defendant, an article of mer-
chandise which, when delivered, would be personal property, and was,
therefore, not within the Statute of Frauds requiring such agreement to
be in writing: Webster et al. v. iely, 52 Barb.
Note or femorandum.-The Statute of Frauds does not require the
note or memorandum therein specified to be made and subscribed by the
party to be charged at the time of making the agreement. It may be
made at any time afterwards, and before the time for its consummation:
Id.
A subsequent written recognition of a contract void by the Statute
of Frauds is not only a ratification of it, but is a sufficient note or
memorandum of the contract within the statute: Id.
Payment of part of Price.-The payment of a part of the purchase-
money, on a contract for the sale of personal property exceeding $50 in
value, need not be made at the time of making the original contract.
If the payment be made subsequently by the one party and accepted by
the other, as the consummation of the prior agreement, it brings the
case within the spirit and intent of the Statute of Frauds, and will be
considered paying a part of the purchase-money at the time : Id.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.
Where a conveyance shows, on its face, that its object and effect was
to prevent, at least temporarily, the enforcement by a creditor of his
demands against the grantor, and to obstruct and hinder their collection,
it is void and in violation of the statute prohibiting such conveyances or
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assignments of property; and upon no legal principle can it be upheld:
Sweet v. Tinslar, 52 Barb.
The rule is well settled that where two or more persons are engaged
in a fraudulent transaction to injure another, neither law nor equity will
interfere to relieve either of such persons, as against the other, from the
consequences of his misconduct: Stewart et al. v. Ackley et al., 52
Barb.
GOLD COIN. See Legal Tender N'otes.
INSURANCE.
Proximate Cause.-Ootton in a warehouse was insured against fire,
the policy containing an exception against fire which might happen "by
means of any invasion, insurrection, riot, or civil commotion, or any mili-
tary or usurped power, explosion, earthquake, or hurricane." An ex-
plosion took place in another warehouse, situated directly across a street,
which threw down the walls of the first warehouse, scattered combustible
materials in the street, and resulted in an extensive conflagration, em-
bracing several squares of buildings, and among them the warehouse
where the cotton was stored, which, with it, was wholly consumed. The
fire was not communicated from the warehouse where the explosion took
place directly to the warehouse where the cotton was, but came more
immediately from a third building which was itself fired by the explo-
sion. Wind was blowing (with what force did not appear) from this
third building to the one in which the cotton was stored. But the
whole fire was a continuous affair from the explosion, and under full
headway in about half an hour. Held, that the insurers were not
liable; the case being one for the application of the maxim, ," Causa
proxima, non remota .ectatur :" Insurance Co. v. Tweed, 7 Wall.
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
Sale of Ship by Belligerent.-A bondfide purchase for a commercial
purpose by a neutral, in his own home port, of a ship of war of a belli-
gerent that had fled to such port in order to escape from enemy vessels
in pursuit, but which was bona fide dismantled prior to the sale and
afterwards fitted up for the merchant service, does not pass a title above
the right of capture by the other belligerent: The Geo~yia, 7 Wall.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Rent reserved to be paid by Repairs.-By a lease, dated March 15th
1864, plaintiff leased a house of the defendant for the term of five
years, "the said Smith yielding and paying therefor rent by" certain
specified repairs on the house; "and the said lessee promises to pay
'he said rent in the repairs, work, materials, and additions, &c., as above
set forth, all to be coinpleted during the years A. D. 1864 and 1865 ;"
",and that said lessors may enter to expel the lessee if he shall fail to
pay the rent as aforesaid." Plaintiff did not make all the repairs before
1866, and in January 1866, the defendant expelled the plaintiff from
the house.
In assumpsit for labor and materials by the plaintiff to recover for the
repairs made by him in 1864 and 1865 upon the house: field, that
plaintiff would be entitled to recover, if the real value of his repairs
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and additions to the house exceeded the fair value of his use and occn-
pati6n of the premises down to the time when he was expelled, and
also the damage suffered by the defendant from the breach or breaches
of the contract by the plaintiff: Smith v. Newcastle, 48 N. H.
Also, held, that plaintiff could not maintain such suit until after the
expiration of the five years embraced in the original contract: 11.
Right to 2anure.-A tenant at will of buildings only, who occupies
part of a barn to keep his cattle and feeds them from his own hay,
which he removes from his own farm for that purpose, will be entitled
to the manure thus made by his cattle, and may remove or sell the same
while such tenancy continues or after it has expired:' Corey v. BLshop,
48 N. H.
And if the lessor, during the continuance of such tenancy or after it
has ceased, sell and convey the premises on which the manure is thus
situated, to a third person, not reserving the manure, yet if the pur-
chaser has knowledge of the facts relative to the manure, he cannot hold
the same under his deed: Id.
.jectment by Landlord- Covenant.-Where, under a clause of re-
entry for non-payment of rent reserved, a landlord sues in ejectment, in
Indiana (in which state a judgment in ejectment has the same conclu-
siveness as common-law judgments in other cases), for recovery of his
estate, as forfeited, and a verdict is found for him, and judgment given
accordingly, the tenant cannot, in another proceeding, deny the validity
of the lease; nor his possession, nor his obligation to pay the rents re-
served, nor that the instalment of rent demanded was due and unpaid:
Sheets v. Selden, 7 Wall.
Where, in a lease of a water-power, the lease provides in a plain way
and with a specification of the rates for an abatement of rent for every
failure of water, the tenant cannot, on a bill by him to enjoin a writ of
possession by the landlord, after a recovery by him at law for forfeiture
of the estate for non-payment of rent reserved, set up a counter claim
for repairs to the water-channel made necessary by the landlord's gross
negligence. He is confined to the remedy specified in the lease; a
covenant that a lessor '1ill make repairs not being to be implied: Id.
In such a case, before he can ask relief from a forfeiture, be should
at least tender the difference between the amount of rents due and the
amount which he could rightly claim by way of reduction for failure
of water: Id.
LEGAT TENDER NOTES
Not Taxable.-United States notes issued under the Loan and Cur-
rency Acts of 186.2 and 1863, intended to circulate as money, and
actually constituting, with the national bank notes, the ordinary circu-
lating medium of the country, are obligations of the National Govern-
ment, and exempt from state taxation: Bank v. Supervisors, 7 Wall.
United States notes are engagements to pay dollars; and the dollars
intended are coined dollars of the United States: JR.
Contracts /or Payment in Con.-A contract to pay a certain sum in
gold and silver coin is in substance and legal effect a contract to deliver
a certain weight of gold and silver of a certain fineness to be ascertained
by count: Butler v. llorwitz, 7 Wall.
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Whether the contract be for the delivery or payment of coin, or bul-
lion, or other property, damages for non-performance must be assessed in
lawful money; that is to say, in money declared to be legal tender in
payment, by a law made in pursuance of the Constitution of the United
States : id.
There are, at this time, two descriptions of lawful money in use under
Acts of Congress, in either of which (assuming these acts, in respect to
legal tender, to be constitutional) damages for non-performance of con-
tracts, whether made before or since the passage of these acts, may be
assessed in the absence of any different understanding or agreement be-
tween the parties: Id.
When the intent of the parties as to the medium of payment is
clearly expressed in a contract, damages for the breach of it, whether
made before or since the enactment of these laws, may be properly
assessed so as to give effect to that intent: Id.
When, therefore, it appears to be the clear intent of a contract that
payment or satisfaction shall be, made in gold and silver, damages should
be assessed in coin, and judgment entered accordingly: Id.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
Complaint showing the Cause to be barred is insufficient.-A petition
that shows upon its fice that the cause of action is barred by the Sta-
tute of Limitations, does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action: Zane v. Zane, 5 Kan.
A defendant in default, who has neither answered nor demurred, has
not thereby waived his right to object to the sufficiency of such a
petition: Id.
And in such a case it is error for the District Court to receive evi-
dence, and render judgment on such a petition, over the objections of
the defendant: Id.
NATURALIZATION.
Foreqn, Woman.-The Act of Congress of February 10th 1855,
waich declares "that any woman, who might lawfully be naturalized
under the existing laws, married, or who shall be married to a citizen
of the United States, shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen," con-
fers the privileges of citizenship upon women married to citizens of the
United States, if they are of the class of persons for whose naturaliza-
tion the previous Acts of Congress provide: Kell v. Owen et al., 7
Wall.
The terms "married," or " who shall be married," in the act, do not
refer to the time when the ceremony of marriage is celebrated, but to a
state of marriage. They mean that whenever a woman, who under pre-
vious acts might be naturalized, is in a state of,marriage to a citizen,
she becomes, by that fact, a citizen also. His citizenship, whenever it
exists, confers citizenship upon her: I.
The object of the act was to allow the citizenship of the wife to fbllow
that of her husband, without the necessity of any application for natu-
ralization on her part: Id.
The terms " who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing
laws," only limit the application of the law to free white women: Id.
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NEw TRIAL.
Review in the Supreme Court.-The granting or refusing a new trial,
for the reason that - the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence,"
must always, to a great extent, be left to the sound discretion of the
court trying the cause; and the Supreme Court will not reverse an order
of the District Court, setting aside .the verdict of the jury and granting
a new trial, unless a great preponderance of the evidence appears to sus-
tain the verdict: Anthony v. Eddy and Arnold, 5 Kan.
PILOT LAWS. See Admiralty.
PLEADING.
Contract with Several Undetakings.-In declaring upon a special
contract the entire consideration must be set forth, and must be proved
as alleged: Smith v. Webster, 48 N. H.
Where a contract consists of several engagements or promises on the
part of defendant, quite distinct and separate from each other, but
1bunded on one and the same entire consideration, an action cannot be
brought for the breach of any one of such engagements or promises,
without setting forth in the declaration the entire consideration applica-
ble to all the promises collectively: Td.
But the rule is different in stating the defendant's promise, for the
plaintiff is only required to set forth with correctness that particular
part of the contract which he alleges the defendant to have broken: Id.
Effect of Plea of Tender-Estoppel.-Where the cause of action in
the declaration is single and indivisible, a plea of tender, or a confes-
sion, is an admission of the cause of action laid in the declaration:
Dow v. Eppinly, 48 N. H.
But where the cause of action is divisible, as where there are several
counts in the declaration, a plea of tender or a confession accompanied
by the general issue, is held simply to admit some cause of action alleged,
and that plaintiff is entitled to recover the amount tendered or confessed
for such cause; but the tender or confession is no admission farther
than that: Id.
Defendant town elected no highway surveyors at its annual meeting,
and the selectmen directed W. to act as a highway surveyor in his
district, and he did so. They issued a warrant in common form, ad-
dressed to him as highway surveyor of said district, directing him to
collect in labor the several taxes specified in his list, and defining the
limits of his district, &c., which warrant he accepted and acted under
through the year. And after he had caused all the taxes in said war-
rant to be expended in labor in said district, he purchased of D., for
the town, a lot of stones to use in repairing a bridge in said district,
and agreed upon the price of the same, as such surveyor, and the stones
were taken and used accordingly. In a suit by D. to recover of the
town the price of the stones, field, that the town could not be heard to
deny that W. was highway surveyor in said district, even though his
appointment may not have been in writing, or his appointment and the
certificate of his oath of office may not be recorded in the town re-
cords: Id.
The selectmen of a town, as its prudential officers, may appoint an
agent to build or repair roads or bridges, in cases where by law it be-
comes their duty thus to build or repair as such selectmen : Id.
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PRACTICE.
Admission of Persons not Parties to defend orprosecut.-According
to the practice in New Hampshire, any person who can satisfy the
court that he has any rights involved in the trial of a cause, may' be
admitted to prosecute or defend the action: Parsons v. Eureka Powder
Works, 48 N. H.
A person not the defendant in interest, but who has been admitted to
defend an action, may properly be allowed, in the discretion of the court,
to plead the Statute of Limitations: Id.
RIVER.
Change qf Channel.-When the channel of a river has been gradu-
ally changing for years, by wearing away the bhnk on the defendant's
side, and by adding and forming accretions upon the opposite shore
owned by plaintiff, by slow and imperceptible degrees, the channel as so
changed must be regarded as the rightful and accustomed channel, for
the time being, as between thedifferent parties: Gerrish v. Clough, 48
N.H.
Such accretions become the property of the landowner upon that side
of the river, and are as much entitled to protection as his original
enclosure: Id.
In such case the defendant may protect his banks from further en-
croachment by rubbling or other means, provided it do not cause a
change in the (then) accustomed channel of the river, to the material
or appreciable injury of other riparian owners; but he has no right to
build a dam, breakwater, or other obstruction in the stream, which will
raise the water upon the plaintiff's land, or wash the same away: Id:
The questions in regard to the right of a reasonable use of the stream,
or in regard to ordinary care and prudence, in erecting such dam or
obstruction, do not arise in such case: Id.
SHIPPING. See Admiraltj.
SUPREME COURT. See Taxation.
Jurdiction. - This court cannot acquire jurisdiction of a cause
through an order of a Circuit Court directing its transfer to this
court, though such transfer be authorized by the express provision
of an Act of Congress. Such provision must be regarded as an attempt,
inadvertently made, to give to this court a jurisdiction withheld by the
Constitution: The Alicia. 7 Wall.
In such a case, a notice to docket and dismiss must be denied, and
this court will certify its opinion to the Circuit Court, for information,
in order that it may proceed with the trial of the -cause: Id.
TAXATION. See Legal Tender Notes.
Certzficates of Indebtedness.-Where an act of a state legislature
authorized the issue of bonds, by way of refunding to banks such por-
tions of a tax as had been assessed on Federal securities made by the
Constitution and statutes of the United States exempt from taxation,
and the officers who were empowered to issue the oligations refused to
sign them. because, as they alleged, a portion of the securities for the
tax on which the bank claimed reimbursement was, in law, not exempt,
and the highest court of the state sanctioned this refusal: Held, that
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
this was a decision by a state court against a right, privilege, or immu-
nity claimed under the Constitution or a statute of the United States,
and so that this court had jurisdiction under the 25th section of the
Judiciary Act, and the amendatory Act of February 5th 1867: The
Bi nks v. Tie .Mayor, 7 Wall.
Certificates of indebtedness issued by the United States to creditors
of the government, for supplies furnished to it in carrying on the recent
war for the integrity of the Union, and by which the government pro-
mised to pay the sums of money specified in them, with interest, at a
time nambd, are beyond the taxing power of the States: Id.
TRES pASS.
lkury to Trespasser-Fence'.Laws.-Every owner of property, be-
fore he can maintain an action to recover for inijuries to it must show
that he used reasonable and ordinary care and diligence, to protect it
from injury: Calins v. .athews, 5 Kan.
While the legislature of this state, by enacting certain fence laws,
and laws regulating the running at large of stock, haye impliedly de-
clared that such reasonable care and diligence with regard to real estate,
shall be to fence it with a lawful fence, and that no action shall lie for
injuries done by roaming cattle, unless such lawful fence is made; yet
they have nowhere attempted to enact any law, giving to any person any
right upon another's land, whether fenced or not; an act of that kind
would tend to disturb vested rights, and be unconstitutional and void: Id.
It is not necessary, in order to enable a party to recover for injuries to
his property, caused by the negligence of others, that he should be en-
tirely free from all negligence himself; but if his negligence is slight,
and that of the other party is gross, or if his is remote, and that of the
other is the proximate cause of the injury, he may recover: Id.
It is a question of fact for the juryto determine, whether there has been
negligence and its nature and degree, but it is a question of law, for the
court to determine, what degree of care and diligence on the one side,
and of negligence on the other, will entitle the plaintiff to recover: Id.
The plaintiff below allowed his horse to run at large. The horse
wandered on to the unenclosed land of the defendant, and fell into an
old well, which caused his death: Held, That the plaintiff cannot re-
cover, unless the defendant was guilty of gross negligence in leaving the
.old well open: Id.
It was error for the court to charge the jury in such a case, that the
defendant is liable, if through his failure to exercise ordinary care and
prudence in the management of his land the horse was killed: Id
Tide of Plaintiff.-In an action for cutting down and carrying away
timber, from a certain piece of land in the possession of the plaintiff
below, who claims to be the owner thereof, and whose evidence of title
is, 1st. A patent from the United States to an incompetent Wyandotte
Indian, issued under article 4 of the treaty with the Wyandottes, of
January 31st 1855; and 2d. A deed, not approved by the Secretary
of the Interior, from said Wyandotte Indian to himself: Held, That the
plaintiff may maintain the action. That although his title may be de-
fective, yet while he is in possession, claiming to be the owner, and has
color of title, no mere wrongdoer can dispute his title: Nelson v.
Matier, 5 Kan.
